In cryptography, FEAL (the Fast data Encipherment ALgorithm) is a block cipher proposed as an alternative to the Data Encryption Standard (DES), and designed to be much faster in software. The Feistel based algorithm was first published in 1987 by Akihiro Shimizu and Shoji Miyaguchi from NTT. The cipher is susceptible to various forms of cryptanalysis, and has acted as a catalyst in the discovery of differential and linear cryptanalysis.
There have been several different revisions of FEAL, though all are Feistel ciphers, and make use of the same basic round function and operate on a 64bit block. One of the earliest designs is now termed FEAL4, which has four rounds and a 64bit key.
Unfortunately, problems were found with FEAL4 from the start: Bert den Boer related a weakness in an unpublished rump session at the same conference where the cipher was first presented. A later paper (den Boer, 1988) describes an attack requiring 100–10000 chosen plaintexts, and Sean Murphy (1990) found an improvement that needs only 20 chosen plaintexts. Murphy and den Boer's methods contain elements similar to those used in differential cryptanalysis.
The designers countered by doubling the number of rounds, FEAL8 (Shimizu and Miyaguchi, 1988). However, eight rounds also proved to be insufficient — in 1989, at the Securicom conference, Eli Biham and Adi Shamir described a differential attack on the cipher, mentioned in (Miyaguchi, 1989). Gilbert and Chassé (1990) subsequently published a statistical attack similar to differential cryptanalysis which requires 10000 pairs of chosen plaintexts.
In response, the designers introduced a variableround cipher, FEALN (Miyaguchi, 1990), where "N" was chosen by the user, together with FEALNX, which had a larger 128bit key. Biham and Shamir's differential cryptanalysis (1991) showed that both FEALN and FEALNX could be broken faster than exhaustive search for N ≤ 31. Later attacks, precursors to linear cryptanalysis, could break versions under the known plaintext assumption, first (TardyCorfdir and Gilbert, 1991) and then (Matsui and Yamagishi, 1992), the latter breaking FEAL4 with 5 known plaintexts, FEAL6 with 100, and FEAL8 with 2^{15}.
In 1994, Ohta and Aoki presented a linear cryptanalytic attack against FEAL8 that required 2^{12} known plaintexts q79.
See alsoEdit
ReferencesEdit
 Eli Biham, Adi Shamir: Differential Cryptanalysis of Feal and NHash. EUROCRYPT 1991: 1–16
 Bert den Boer, Cryptanalysis of F.E.A.L., EUROCRYPT 1988: 293–299
 Henri Gilbert, Guy Chassé: A Statistical Attack of the FEAL8 Cryptosystem. CRYPTO 1990: 22–33.
 Shoji Miyaguchi: The FEAL Cipher Family. CRYPTO 1990: 627–638
 Shoji Miyaguchi: The FEAL8 Cryptosystem and a Call for Attack. CRYPTO 1989: 624–627
 Mitsuru Matsui, Atsuhiro Yamagishi: A New Method for Known Plaintext Attack of FEAL Cipher. EUROCRYPT 1992: 81–91
 Sean Murphy, The Cryptanalysis of FEAL4 with 20 Chosen Plaintexts. J. Cryptology 2(3): 145–154 (1990)
 A. Shimizu and S. Miyaguchi, Fast data encipherment algorithm FEAL, Advances in Cryptology — Eurocrypt '87, SpringerVerlag (1988), 267–280.
 Anne TardyCorfdir, Henri Gilbert: A Known Plaintext Attack of FEAL4 and FEAL6. CRYPTO 1991: 172–181
External linksEdit
